

Update #4

CBCG Research Projects for 2016

The Daniel Project

February 3, 2016

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

Dear Fred,

Update #4 covers the events of Daniel 11:10-12. All three verses are dedicated to the Battle of Raphia. This battle was fought on 22 June 217 BC at the extreme southern end of what we now call the Gaza Strip. Being that there were only 12 hours of daylight on 22 June, the combatants engaged, fought and either won or lost during this short period of time on a single day. The combatants at this battle were none other than Antiochus II the Great of Syria (King of the North) and Ptolemy IV of Egypt (King of the South and lover of his sister).

One of the greatest battles ever fought in the Middle East was prophesied by Daniel in 539 BC, 322 years before it was fought. While covering only three verses in Daniel 11; the tactical detail of the execution of this battle is uncanny! With pinpoint accuracy, Daniel prophesied the strategy of a great battle that played out over a 12 hour period on 22 June 217 BC.

Me thinks this has to be an “appointed time” of calendric proportions! All of this was preparatory for the prophesied birth of the long awaited Messiah in 5 BC--Jesus the Christ. The King of the North also invited the intervention of Rome at this time. This initial contact opened the door for the eventual Rome’s conquest of the entire region to the River Euphrates, their eastward most line of conquest dated 117 AD (time of Emperor Hadrian). The Romans were literally stopped dead in their Legionnaire tracks by the Israelite armies of the mighty Parthian Empire!

I am very anxious to see what Dwight does with this one!!!! (Dwight, notice that there are four !!!! marks. There must be something of great significance playing out here through the fingers of my hands--my friend! :).

Your brother in Christ,
Carl

CC: Ron Cary
Dwight Blevins

P.S. Dr. Hoeh traced the Macedonian Ptolemaic and Seleucidae lines from Noah as follows:

Noah>Ham>Canaan>Adah (Bashemath of the Bible)>Eliphas who married Timna (daughter of Seir the Horite Hercules)> Amalek> ancestor of the Hyksos, Balaam, Alexander the Great and the Ptolemaic and Seleucidae lines of Egypt and Syria.

Introductory Remarks

Daniel 11:10-12

Seleucid Dynasty Kings of the North

The Following Kings of the North NOT Mentioned in
Daniel 11:10-12

Battle of Raphia Occurs on 1 Day
Friday, 22 June 217 BC
Friday, 13 Tammuz 217 BC

King	Reign (BC)		Seleucid Kings of Daniel 11:10-20 (yellow highlighted)
1-Seleucus I Nicator	King 305-281	Apama ^C	Subject of Daniel 11:5
2-Antiochus I Soter	King 281-261	Stratonice ^C	Subject of Daniel 11:6
3-Antiochus II Theos	King 261-246	Laodice I ^C Berenice ^C	Subject of Daniel 11:6 Daughter of 2-Ptolemy II
<hr/> <hr/>			
7-Seleucus IV Philopator	King 187-175	Laodice IV ^C	
8-Antiochus IV Epiphanes	King 175-163	Laodice IV ^C	

**The Following Kings of the North MENTIONED in Daniel 11:10-12
Battle Occurs on 1 Day
22 June 217 BC**

4-Seleucus II

Callinicus King 246-225 Laodice II^C **Subject of Daniel 11:10-12**

5-Seleucus III

Ceraunus or Soter King 225-223 Euboea^C **Subject of Daniel 11:10-12**

6-Antiochus III the Great King 223-187 Laodice III^C **Subject of Daniel 11:10-12**

C = Consort

Yellow Highlight = Seleucid Kings or Family member of a King prophesied in **Daniel 11:10-12**

Ptolemaic Dynasty

Kings of the South

Daniel 11:5-10-12

**The Following Kings of the South NOT Mentioned in
Daniel 11:10-12**

**Battle of Raphia Occurs on 1 Day
Friday, 22 June 217 BC
Friday, 13 Tammuz 217 BC**

King	Reign (BC)	Ptolemaic Kings of Daniel 11:10-12 (yellow highlighted)
1-Ptolemy I Lagus or Soter	King 305-284	Thais ^C Artakama ^C Eurydice ^C Berenice I ^C Subject of Daniel 11:5
2-Ptolemy II Philadelphus	King 285-246	Arsinoe I ^C Arsinoe II ^C Subject of Daniel 11:6
3-Ptolemy III Euergetes	King 246-221	2-Berenice II ^C Subject of Daniel 11:7 2-Berenice II ^C Subject of Daniel 11:8-9
5-Ptolemy V Epiphanes	King 203-181	Cleopatra I ^C
6-Ptolemy VI Philometor	King 181-164	Cleopatra II ^C

The Following Kings of the South MENTIONED in Daniel 11:10-12

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator Arsinoe III ^C **Subject of Daniel 11:10-12**

^C = Consort

Yellow Highlight = Polemaic Kings or Family of Kings Prophesied in Daniel 11:10-12

Outline of the Six Syrian Wars
Listing Major Players
Fighting for Control of the Holy Land
Period Covered = 274 to 168 BC
(106 Years)
Daniel 11:5-20

War Dates	Duration	Kings of the North	Kings of the South
1 st Syrian War Interrum	274-271 BC (c. 11 years)	3 Years	2-Antiochus I
2 nd Syrian War Interrum	260-253 BC (c. 7 years)	7 Years	2-Ptolemy II
3 rd Syrian War Interrum	246-241 BC (c. 22 years)	5 Years	3-Ptolemy III
4 th Syrian War Interrum	219-217 BC (c. 25 years)	2 Years	6-Antiochus III
5 th Syrian War Interrum	202-195 BC (c. 25 years)	7 Years	4-Ptolemy IV
6 th Syrian War	170-168 BC	2 Years	6-Antiochus III 5-Ptolemy V
			8-Antiochus IV Epiphanes

Revolt of the Maccabees
167-160 BC

Exegesis of Daniel 11:10-12

4th Syrian War
219 to 217 BC—2 Years Duration

The Battle of Raphia

Fought on 1 Day
Friday, 22 June 217 BC
Friday, 13 Tammuz 217 BC

The Combatants

6-Antiochus III the Great-King of the North
(223-186 BC)
4-Ptolemy IV Philopator -King of the South
(221-205 BC)

Historical and Exegetical Commentary

KEIL AND DELITZSCH: So the prophetic announcement, vv. 5-20, stretches itself over the period from the division of the monarchy of Alexander among his generals to the commencement of the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes in the year 175 B.C., during which there reigned seven Syrian and six Egyptian kings, viz. –

BRITANNICA: **Antiochus IV Epiphanes** was the third son of [Antiochus III](#) the Great. After his father's defeat by the [Romans](#) in 190–189, he served as hostage for his father in [Rome](#) from 189 to 175, where he learned to admire Roman institutions and policies.

Daniel 11:10-12

4th Syrian War 219 to 217 BC—Duration 2 Years

**A Detailed Prophetic Description of
the Battle of Raphia—Fought 22 June, 217 BC
6-Antiochus III Defeated**

**Prophecy Given to Daniel by Gabriel in 539 BC
322 Years Before 217 BC**

**Although the Battle of Raphia was not fought near or on a
Holy Day—We Can be Sure it was, I believe, fought at a
“Time Appointed” on the Hebrew Calendar**

Combatants

**King of
the North**

**6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)**

**King of
the South**

**4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)**

Annotated Biblical Account

11:10 *But his sons* [Antiochus III and Seleucus, sons of Seleucus II] *shall be stirred up* ²⁶, *and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: and one* [Antiochus III] *shall certainly come, and overflow* [like an “overflowing torrent” ²⁷, *and pass through* ²⁸ [the first Palestinian campaign of Antiochus III in which he penetrated the Holy Land as far as Dura (near Caesarea)-then gave Ptolemy IV a 4 month truce. His second campaign penetrated as far as Ptolemy’s fortress town of Raphia]: *then shall he* [Ptolemy IV Philopator] *return* ²⁹ [to Egypt], *and be stirred up, even to his fortress* [of Raphia] ³⁰ [raising an Egyptian army of seventy-thousand infantry men for a future battle—known as the Battle of Raphia].

11:11 *And the king of the south* ³¹ [Ptolemy IV Philopater] *shall be moved with choler, and shall come forth and fight with him* ³² [Antiochus III], *even with the king of the north* ³³: *and he* ³⁴ [Antiochus III] *shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand* ³⁵ [the hand of Ptolemy IV] (v. 11).

11:12 *And when he* ³⁶ [Ptolemy IV] *hath taken away* ³⁷ [subdued] *the multitude, his heart shall be lifted up; and he* ³⁸ [Ptolemy IV] *shall cast down many ten thousands* ³⁹ [at the Battle of Raphia, 217 BC]: *but he shall not be strengthened by it* ⁴⁰.

Daniel 11:10-12

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

King of
the South

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:10 *But his sons* [Antiochus III and Seleucus, sons of Seleucus II] *shall be stirred up* ²⁶, and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: *and one* [6-Antiochus III] *shall certainly come, and overflow* ²⁷, *and pass through* ²⁸ [the first Palestinian campaign of 6-Antiochus III]: *then shall he* [4-Ptolemy IV Philopator] *return* ²⁹ [to Egypt to raise an army of seventy-thousand men to defend his fortress at Raphia], *and be stirred up, even to his fortress* ³⁰ [at the Battle of Raphia].

Verse 10—Note 26)—“*But his sons shall be stirred up* ²⁶”

A reference to **5-Seleucus III Ceraunus or Soter** (225-223 BC)
King of the North—son of **4-Seleucus II Callinicus** (246-225 BC)

As well as

A reference to **6-Antiochus III, the Great** (223-187 BC).
King of the North—son of **4-Seleucus II Callinicus**
(246-225 BC)

Daniel 11:10-12

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:10 *But his sons* [Antiochus III and Seleucus, sons of Seleucus II] *shall be stirred up* ²⁶, *and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: and one* [6-Antiochus III] *shall certainly come, and overflow* ²⁷, *and pass through* ²⁸ [the first Palestinian campaign of 6-Antiochus III]: *then shall he* [4-Ptolemy IV Philopater] *return* ²⁹ [to Egypt to raise an army of seventy-thousand men to defend his fortress at Raphia], *and be stirred up, even to his fortress* ³⁰ [at the Battle of Raphia].

Verse 10—Note 27)—“*and one shall certainly come, and overflow* ²⁷,”

A reference to **6-Antiochus III the Great** (223-187 BC)-son of **4-Seleucus II Callinicus** (246-225 BC)

Verse 10—Note 28)—“*and pass through* ²⁸,”

The first Palestinian campaign of **6-Antiochus III the Great** (223-187 BC).

A subsequent campaign of 6-Antiochus III. The decisive battle of the 4th Syrian War 219-217 BC—Battle of Raphia (modern day Rafah in the Gaza Strip) fought on 22 June 217 BC. **Battle of Raphia a Ptolemaic victory.**

Daniel 11:10-12

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

**King of
the North**

**6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)**

**King of
the South**

**4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)**

11:10 *But his sons* [6-Antiochus III and 5-Seleucus III, sons of Seleucus II] *shall be stirred up*²⁶, *and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: and one* [6-Antiochus III] *shall certainly come, and overflow*²⁷, *and pass through*²⁸ [the first Palestinian campaign of 6-Antiochus III]: *then shall he* [4-Ptolemy IV Philopator] *return*²⁹ [to Egypt to raise an army of seventy-thousand men to defend his fortress at Raphia], *and be stirred up, even to his fortress*³⁰ [at the Battle of Raphia].

Verse 10—Note 29)—“*then shall he* [4-Ptolemy IV Philopater] *return*²⁹,”

A reference to **4-Ptolemy IV Philopater (221-205 BC)** returning to Alexandria, Egypt to raise an army of 70,000 infantry, supported by heavy cavalry and pachyderm heavy armor to defend his fortress at Raphia. (See Chart “Raising Armies” below).

Daniel 11:10

Chart “Raising Armies”

Date	22 June 217 BC
Location	Rafah , near Gaza
Result	Ptolemaic victory
Belligerents	
Ptolemaic Egypt	Seleucid Empire
Commanders and leaders	
Ptolemy IV of Egypt	Antiochus III the Great
Strength	
70,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 73 elephants	62,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 102 elephants
Casualties and losses	
1,500 infantry, 700 horse, 16 elephants killed, almost 26 captured	10,000 infantry, 300 horse and 5 elephants killed, 4,000 infantry captured
Wikipedia stats	

4-Ptolemy IV lost 1,500 infantry + 700 cavalry men + $16 \times 5 = 80$ pachyderm “tankers” = **a total of 2280 warriors.**

6-Antiochus III lost 10,000 infantry + 6,000 cavalry men + $5 \times 5 = 25$ pachyderm “tankers” + 4,000 infantry captured = **a total of 22,385 warriors.**

Total killed and captured total = 24,665 warriors out of a combined total of = 143,875 combatants = 17% killed or captured. A comparison with D-Day casualties 6 June 1944:

“...recent painstaking research by the US National D-Day Memorial Foundation...has recorded the names of individual Allied personnel killed on 6 June 1944 in Operation Overlord, and so far they have verified 2499 American D-Day fatalities and 1915 from the other Allied nations, a total of 4414 dead (much higher than the traditional figure of 2500 dead).

(<http://history.stackexchange.com/questions/25/how-many-troops-died-on-d-day>)

Daniel 11:10

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:10 *But his sons* [6-Antiochus III and 5-Seleucus III, sons of Seleucus II] *shall be stirred up* ²⁶, *and shall assemble a multitude of great forces: and one* [6-Antiochus III] *shall certainly come, and overflow* ²⁷, *and pass through* ²⁸ [the first Palestinian campaign of 6-Antiochus III]: *then shall he* [4-Ptolemy IV Philopator] *return* ²⁹ [to Egypt to raise an army of seventy-thousand men to defend his fortress at Raphia], *and be stirred up, even to his fortress* ³⁰ [at the Battle of Raphia].

Verse 10—Note 30)—“*and be stirred up, even to his fortress* ³⁰”

A reference to 4-**Ptolemy IV** deploying his troops to the fortress of Raphia preparatory to the Battle fought on 22 June, 217 BC. (See Map “Gaza Strip” and Map “A” below.)

Daniel 11:10

Map “Gaza Strip”



Wikipedia Map


CDF-The ancient fortress of **4-Ptolemy IV** where the Battle of Raphia was fought, was located on the border of Egypt with the Holy Land (Palestine) at the modern Refugee Camp of Rafah in the Gaza Strip (see bottom of above map).

Daniel 11:10

Map "A"

The Deployment

The battle of Raphia - The deployment



CDF-(My rewrite of the essential information found in a very garbled description attached to Map A). Both armies deployed according to the Hellenistic consolidated operational model; the Phalanx in the center of the battle filed with the flanks protected by light troops and mercenary units and, on the two wings, the cavalries. Ptolemy had deployed its best units, the Royal Guard on the left side, fronted by Antiochus who had deployed with the guard on the right flank of the army. Both rulers had placed their elephants on the two wings, in front of their own cavalry.

Daniel 11:10

Map “A”

The Deployment

The battle of Raphia - The deployment

The German Tiger 2 or King Tiger of WWII



CDF-The African Elephants of **4-Ptolemy IV** were much larger than the Indian Elephants of **6-Antiochus III**. A good modern comparison from WWII is the much larger German Tiger 2 (An “African Elephant”) with the much smaller American M4A3E8 Sherman Fury (An “Indian Elephant”)—**see the real thing below**. Both had their advantages and disadvantages however.

Daniel 11:10

Map “A”

The Deployment

The battle of Raphia - The deployment

The American M4A3E8 “Easy 8” Fury of WWII



CDF-If the tanker in the above picture looks like Brad Pitt—it is he. Although smaller, the American Fury was a match for the German King Tiger of WWII. A well placed cannon shot could pierce the armor of the King Tiger and from what I’ve read the “Easy 8” only caught fire when ammunition was improperly stored and that usually too close to the engine compartment. A direct hit in that area might very well do the job—the engines burned gasoline.

Daniel 11:10
Map “A”
The Deployment

The battle of Raphia - The deployment

**The Indian Elephant “Fury Tank”
vs. the African Elephant “Tiger 2 Tank”**



Daniel 11:11

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

King of
the South

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:11 And the king of the south [4-Ptolemy IV Philopater] shall be moved with choler ³¹, and shall come forth and fight with him ³² [6-Antiochus III], even with the king of the north ³³: and he ³⁴ [6-Antiochus III] shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand ³⁵ [the hand of 4-Ptolemy IV] (v. 11).


Verse 11—Notes 31-35)

Note 31—A reference to **6-Antiochus III the Great (223-187 BC)** attacking the left flank of **4-Ptolemy IV Philopator** in the initial minutes of the Battle of Raphia, **22 June 217 BC**. (See **Map B** below).

The Battle of Raphia

“Map B”

Antiochus III Attacks the Left Flank of Ptolemy IV



Daniel 11:11

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:11 And the king of the south [4-Ptolemy IV Philopater] shall be moved with choler³¹, and shall come forth and fight with him³² [6-Antiochus III], even with the king of the north³³: and he³⁴ [6-Antiochus III] shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand³⁵ [the hand of 4-Ptolemy IV] (v. 11).

Verse 11—Notes 31-35)


(See Map C below).

Note 32—A reference to **4-Ptolemy IV Philopater** attacking the left flank of **6-Antiochus III the Great** (223-187 BC) in the initial minutes/hours of the Battle of Raphia, **22 June 217 BC**. (See Map C below).

The Battle of Raphia

“Map C”

Ptolemy IV Attacks the Left Flank of Antiochus III



Daniel 11:11

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:11 And the king of the south [4-Ptolemy IV Philopater] shall be moved with choler³¹, and shall come forth and fight with him³² [6-Antiochus III], even with the king of the north³³: and he³⁴ [6-Antiochus III] shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand³⁵ [the hand of 4-Ptolemy IV] (v. 11).

Verse 11—Notes 31-35)


(See Map D below).

Note 33—A reference to the collapse of both left flanks of **6-Antiochus III the Great** (223-187 BC) and **4-Ptolemy IV Philopator** in the initial hours of the Battle of Raphia, **22 June 217 BC**.

The Battle of Raphia

“Map D”

The Left Flanks of Both Armies Collapse



Daniel 11:11

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:11 And the king of the south [4-Ptolemy IV Philopater] shall be moved with choler ³¹, and shall come forth and fight with him ³² [6-Antiochus III], even with the king of the north ³³: and he ³⁴ [6-Antiochus III] shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand ³⁵ [the hand of 4-Ptolemy IV] (v. 11).

Verse 11—Notes 31-35)


(See Map E below).

Note 33—A reference to the destruction of both left flanks of **6-Antiochus III the Great (223-187 BC)** and **4-Ptolemy IV Philopater** in the initial hours of the Battle of Raphia, **22 June 217 BC**.

The Battle of Raphia

“Map E”

The Left Flank of Ptolemy IV is Destroyed
The Left Flank of Antiochus III is Destroyed



Daniel 11:11

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:11 And the king of the south [4-Ptolemy IV Philopator] shall be moved with choler ³¹, and shall come forth and fight with him ³² [6-Antiochus III], even with the king of the north ³³: and he ³⁴ [6-Antiochus III] shall set forth a great multitude; but the multitude shall be given into his hand ³⁵ [the hand of 4-Ptolemy IV] (v. 11).

Verse 11—Notes 31-35)


(See Map F below).

Note 35—A reference to the Macedonian and Egyptian Phalanx of **4-Ptolemy IV Philopator** attacking and destroying the Macedonian and Arab Phalanx of **6-Antiochus III the Great** in the last hours of the **Battle of Raphia, 22 June 217 BC.**

The Battle of Raphia

“Map F”

**The Macedonian and Egyptian Phalanx of Ptolemy IV
Attack and Destroy the Macedonian and Arab Phalanx
of Antiochus III**



Daniel 11:12

Detailed Account

Battle of Raphia

22 June, 217

1 Day

Combatants

King of
the North

6-Antiochus III the Great
(223-187 BC)

King of
the South

4-Ptolemy IV Philopator
(221-205 BC)

11:12 And when he ³⁶ [Ptolemy IV] hath taken away ³⁷ [subdued] the multitude ³⁸, [5-Ptolemy IV total routs the armies of 6-Antiochus III] his heart shall be lifted up; and he ³⁹ [Ptolemy IV] shall cast down many ten thousands ⁴⁰ [at the Battle of Raphia, 217 BC]: but he shall not be strengthened by it ⁴¹.

Verse 12—Notes 36-41)

SEE: Historical and Exegetical Commentary below.

Historical and Exegetical Commentary

Daniel 11:10-12

The Battle of Raphia 22 June 217 BC

“The Battle of Raphia, also known as the Battle of Gaza^[citation needed], was a battle fought on 22 June 217 BC near modern [Rafah](#) between the forces of [Ptolemy IV Philopator](#), king and pharaoh of [Ptolemaic Egypt](#) and [Antiochus III the Great](#) of the [Seleucid Empire](#) during the [Syrian Wars](#). It was one of the largest battles of the Hellenistic kingdoms and was one of the largest battles of the ancient world. The battle was waged to determine the sovereignty of [Coele Syria](#)” [Lebanon, Syria and the Holy Land--CDF] (Wikipedia article “The Battle of Raphia”).

The two largest of the Hellenistic kingdoms, [Ptolemaic Egypt](#) and the [Seleucid Empire](#), were bitter enemies, and repeatedly fought for control of Syria [the modern regions of Lebanon, Syria and Israel—known as The Levant—CDF]. These were the Syrian Wars. The Fourth Syrian War began in 219 B.C. Ptolemaic Egypt was ruled by [Ptolemy IV](#), and the Seleucid Empire was ruled by [Antiochus III the Great](#).

By 217 B.C. Antiochus and the Seleucid army advanced through Syria. Ptolemy’s self-interests led his ministers, advisors and generals to make serious preparations. Both kingdoms disputed Syria [referring here to the Levant--CDF]. The Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies met near the small Syrian town of [Rafah](#). Antiochus initially set up his camp at a distance of 10 (about 2 km) and then only 5 stades (about 1 km) from his adversary's.

Many skirmishes took place before the battle due to this proximity. One night, Theodotus the Aetolian, formerly an officer of Ptolemy, sneaked inside the Ptolemaic camp and reached what he presumed to be the King's tent but Ptolemy was absent and so failed to assassinate him” (Wikipedia article “The Battle of Raphia”).

Historical and Exegetical Commentary

Daniel 11:10-12

6-Antiochus III the Great (223-187 BC)
Seleucid King of the North



Also known as
Antiochus Megas
Antiochus the Great
born
242 BCE
died
187 BCE
[near Susa, Iran](#)

BRITANNICA: Antiochus III, byname Antiochus The Great, Greek Antiochus Megas (born 242 bc—died 187, near [Susa, Iran](#)), Seleucid king of the [Hellenistic Syrian Empire](#) from 223 bc to 187, who rebuilt the empire in the East but failed in his attempt to challenge Roman ascendancy in Europe and Asia Minor. He reformed the empire administratively by reducing the provinces in size, established a ruler cult (with himself and his consort Laodice as divine), and improved relations with neighbouring countries by giving his daughters in marriage to their princes.

The son of Seleucus II, Antiochus succeeded his brother Seleucus III as king. He retained from the previous administration [Hermias](#) as chief minister, Achaeus as governor of Asia Minor, and [Molon](#) and his brother Alexander as governors of the eastern provinces, Media and Persis. In the following year, when Molon rebelled and assumed the title of king, Antiochus abandoned a campaign against Egypt for the conquest of southern [Syria](#), on the advice of Hermias, and marched against Molon, defeating him in 220 bc on the far bank of the Tigris and also conquering Atropatene, the northwestern part of Media. Shortly thereafter he had Hermias killed and was thus rid of most of the influences from the previous administration. In the same year, Achaeus set himself up as king in Asia Minor, but a mutiny in his army kept him from attacking Antiochus.

Antiochus was now free to conduct what has been called the Fourth [Syrian War](#) (219–216), during which he gained control of the important eastern Mediterranean sea ports of Seleucia-in-Pieria, Tyre, and Ptolemais. In 218 he held Coele Syria (Lebanon), Palestine, and Phoenicia. In 217 he engaged an army (numbering 75,000) of [Ptolemy IV Philopator](#), a pharaoh of the Hellenistic dynasty ruling Egypt, at Raphia, the southernmost city in Syria. His own troops numbered 68,000. Though he succeeded in routing the left wing of the Egyptian army, his phalanx (heavily armed infantry in close ranks) in the centre was defeated by a newly formed Egyptian phalanx. In the subsequent peace settlement, Antiochus gave up all his conquests except the city of Seleucia-in-Pieria.

After the Syrian [war](#), he proceeded against the rebel Achaeus. In alliance with [Attalus I](#) of [Pergamum](#), Antiochus captured Achaeus in 213 in his capital, [Sardis](#), and had him executed in a barbaric manner. After the pacification of Asia Minor he entered upon his later to be famous eastward campaign (212–205), pressing forward as far as [India](#). In 212 he gave his sister Antiochis in marriage to King Xerxes of Armenia, who acknowledged his suzerainty and paid him tribute. He occupied Hecatompylos (southeast of the Caspian Sea), the capital of the [Parthian](#) king Arsaces III, and forced him to enter into an alliance in 209 and the following year

defeated [Euthydemus](#) of [Bactria](#), though he allowed him to continue to rule and retain his royal title. In 206 he marched across the [Hindu Kush](#) into the Kābul Valley and renewed a friendship with the Indian king Sophagasenos.

Returning westward via the Iranian provinces of Arachosia, Drangiana, and Carmania, he arrived in Persis in 205 and received tribute of 500 talents of silver from the citizens of Gerrha, a mercantile state on the east coast of the [Persian Gulf](#). Having established a magnificent system of vassal states in the East, Antiochus now adopted the ancient Achaemenid title of “great king,” and the Greeks, comparing him to [Alexander the Great](#), surnamed him also “the Great.”

After the death of Ptolemy IV, Antiochus concluded a secret treaty with [Philip V](#), ruler of the Hellenistic kingdom of [Macedonia](#), in which the two plotted the division of the Ptolemaic empire outside Egypt. Antiochus’ share was to be southern Syria, Lycia, Cilicia, and Cyprus; Philip was to have western Asia Minor and the Cyclades. Antiochus invaded Coele Syria, defeated the Ptolemaic general Scopas at Panion near the source of the [Jordan River](#) in the year 200, gained control of Palestine, and granted special rights to the Jewish temple state. But Philip, marching along the Dardanelles, became involved in a war with [Rhodes](#) and [Pergamum](#), both of whom appealed to Rome for help against Macedonia, informing Rome of the alliance between the two Hellenistic kings. Rome intervened decisively in the system of Hellenistic states. Philip was defeated by the Romans in the Second [Macedonian War](#) (200–196), and Antiochus refused to help him. Instead, taking advantage of the Romans’ involvement with Philip, Antiochus marched against Egypt. Though the Romans had sent ambassadors to [Ptolemy V](#), they could not lend him any serious assistance. When peace was concluded in 195, Antiochus came permanently into possession of southern Syria—which had been fought over for 100 years by the Ptolemies and Seleucids—and of the Egyptian territories in Asia Minor. He also gave his daughter [Cleopatra](#) in marriage to Ptolemy V. Egypt practically became a Seleucid protectorate.

In his insatiable expansionist drive, Antiochus occupied parts of the kingdom of Pergamum in 198 and in 197 Greek cities in Asia Minor. In 196 bc he crossed the Hellespont into [Thrace](#), where he claimed sovereignty over territory that had been won by Seleucus I in the year 281 bc. A war of harassment and diplomacy with Rome ensued. A number of times the Romans sent ambassadors demanding that Antiochus stay out of Europe and set free all the autonomous communities in Asia Minor. To meet these demands would have meant the actual dissolution of the western part of the Seleucid Empire, and Antiochus thus refused. Tensions with Rome increased further when the great Carthaginian general [Hannibal](#), who had fled

from Carthage in the aftermath of defeat by the Romans in the Second Punic War, found refuge with Antiochus in 195 bc and became his adviser.

Antiochus offered an alliance to Philip of Macedonia, whom he had previously forsaken, but was rebuffed. Philip, Rhodes, Pergamum, and the [Achaean League](#) joined Rome. Only the [Aetolians](#), discontent with Rome's growing influence in Greece, called upon Antiochus to be their liberator and appointed him commander in chief of their league. Relying on them Antiochus landed in Demetrias in the autumn of 192 with only 10,500 men and occupied Euboea. But he found little support in central Greece. In 191 the Romans, numbering more than 20,000, cut him off from his reinforcements in Thrace and outflanked his position at the pass of Thermopylae (in Greece). With the remainder of his troops Antiochus fled to Chalcis on Euboea and from there by sea to Ephesus; his fleet was wiped out by the combined naval forces of Rome, Rhodes, and Pergamum. Meeting no resistance, the Roman army crossed the Hellespont in 190. Antiochus was now eager to negotiate on the basis of Rome's previous demands, but the Romans insisted that he first evacuate the region west of the [Taurus Mountains](#). When Antiochus refused, he was decisively defeated in the [Battle of Magnesia](#) near Mt. Sipylus, where he fought with a heterogeneous army of 70,000 men against an army of 30,000 Romans and their allies. Although he could have continued the war in the eastern provinces, he renounced all claim to his conquests in Europe and in Asia Minor west of the Taurus at the peace [treaty of Apamea](#). He also was obliged to pay an indemnity of 15,000 talents over a period of 12 years, surrender his elephants and his fleet, and furnish hostages, including his son [Antiochus IV](#). His kingdom was now reduced to Syria, Mesopotamia, and western Iran. In 187 Antiochus was murdered in a Baal temple near Susa, where he was exacting tribute in order to obtain much needed revenue.

[Hans Volkmann](#)

Historical and Exegetical Commentary

Daniel 11:10-12

4-Ptolmy IV Philopator (221-205 BC)

Ptolemaic King of the South

Macedonian king of Egypt

Ptolemy IV Philopator Macedonian king of Egypt

born

c. 238 BCE

died

205 BCE

Written by: [The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica](#)

BRITANNICA: Ptolemy IV Philopator, (Greek: “Loving His Father”) (born c. 238 bce—died 205 bce), Macedonian king of Egypt (reigned 221–205 bc), under whose feeble rule, heavily influenced by favourites, much of Ptolemaic Syria was lost and native uprisings began to disturb the internal stability of Egypt.

Classical writers depict Ptolemy as a drunken, debauched reveller, completely under the influence of his disreputable associates, among whom Sosibius was the most prominent. At their instigation, Ptolemy arranged the murder of his mother, uncle, and brother.

Following the defection of one of Ptolemy’s best commanders, Egypt’s Syro-Palestinian territory, Coele Syria, was seriously threatened by Antiochus III, the Syrian Seleucid ruler. In 219, when the Seleucid ruler captured some of the coastal cities, Sosibius and the Ptolemaic court entered into delaying negotiations with the enemy, while the Ptolemaic army was reorganized and intensively drilled. So grave was the threat that for the first time under the Ptolemaic regime native Egyptians were enrolled into the infantry and cavalry and trained in phalanx tactics. In 218 the negotiations collapsed, and Antiochus renewed his advance, overrunning Ptolemy’s

forward defenses. In the spring of 217, however, Ptolemy's new army met the Seleucid forces near Raphia in southern Palestine, and with the help of the Egyptian phalanx Ptolemy was victorious. Although holding the initiative, the Egyptian king, on Sosibius's advice, negotiated a peace, and the Seleucid army withdrew from Coele Syria.

After Raphia, Ptolemy married his sister, Arsinoe, who bore him a successor in 210. The Egyptians, however, sensing their power, rose in a rebellion that Polybius, the Greek historian, describes as guerrilla warfare. By 205 the revolt had spread to [Upper Egypt](#).

To the south, Ptolemy maintained peaceful relations with the neighbouring kingdom. In the Aegean, he retained a number of islands, but, in spite of honours granted him, he refused to become embroiled in the wars of the Greek states. In Syria, also, Ptolemy avoided involvement in local struggles, though Sosibius attempted to embroil Egypt there. According to Polybius, Ptolemy's debauched and corrupt character, rather than his diplomatic acumen, kept him clear of foreign involvements. As his reign progressed, he fell increasingly under the influence of his favourites, and around November 205 he died. His clique of favourites kept Ptolemy's death a secret and about a year later murdered Queen Arsinoe, leaving the young successor at their mercy.

Historical and Exegetical Commentary

Daniel 11:10-12

The Development of Military Tactics

BRITANNICA: **Tactics**, in warfare, the art and science of fighting battles on land, on sea, and in the air. It is concerned with the approach to combat; the disposition of troops and other personalities; the use made of various arms, ships, or aircraft; and the execution of movements for attack or [defense](#).

This article discusses the tactics of [land warfare](#). For treatment of tactics on sea, see [naval warfare](#), and for tactics in air combat, see [air warfare](#).

Fundamentals

Evolution of the term

The word *tactics* originates in the Greek *taxis*, meaning order, arrangement, or disposition—including the kind of disposition in which armed [formations](#) used to enter and fight battles. From this, the Greek historian Xenophon derived the term *tactica*, the art of drawing up soldiers in array. Likewise, the *Tactica*, an early 10th-century handbook said to have been written under the supervision of the Byzantine emperor Leo VI the Wise, dealt with formations as well as weapons and the ways of fighting with them.

The term tactics fell into disuse during the European Middle Ages. It reappeared only toward the end of the 17th century, when “Tactics” was used by the English encyclopaedist John Harris to mean “the Art of Disposing any Number of Men into a proposed form of Battle.” Further development took place toward the end of the 18th century. Until then, authors had considered fighting to be almost the sum total of [war](#); now, however, it began to be regarded as merely one part of war. The art of fighting itself continued to carry the name tactics, whereas that of making the fight take place under the most favourable circumstances, as well as utilizing it after it had taken place, was given a new name: [strategy](#).

Since then, the terms tactics and [strategy](#) have usually marched together, but over time each has acquired both a prescriptive and a descriptive meaning. There have also been attempts to distinguish between [minor tactics](#), the art of fighting

individuals or small units, and [grand tactics](#), a term coined about 1780 by the French military author Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert to describe the conduct of major battles. However, this distinction seems to have been lost recently, and the concept of grand tactics has been replaced by the concept of the so-called operational level of war. This may be because, as will be discussed below, battle in the classical sense—that is, of a pitched encounter between the belligerents’ main forces—no longer exists.

Victory through force and guile

The tactics adopted by each separate army on each separate occasion depend on such circumstances as terrain, weather, organization, weaponry, and the enemy in addition to the purpose at hand. Nevertheless, while circumstances and purposes vary, the fundamental principles of tactics, like those of strategy, are eternal. At bottom they derive from the fact that, in war, two forces, each of which is free to exercise its independent will, meet in an attempt to destroy each other while at the same time attempting to avoid being destroyed. To achieve this double aim, they can rely on either force or guile. Assuming the two sides to be approximately equal—in other words, that neither is so strong as to be able to ride roughshod over the other (in which case tactics are hardly required)—a combination of both force and guile is necessary.

To employ force, it is necessary to concentrate in time and place. To employ guile, it is necessary to disperse, hide, and feint. Force is best generated by taking the shortest route toward the objective and focusing all available resources on one and the same action, whereas guile implies dispersion, the use of circuitous paths, and never doing the same thing twice. These two factors, most conducive to victory in battle, are not complementary; on the contrary, they can normally be employed only at each other’s expense. In this way tactics (as well as strategy) are subject to a peculiar logic—one similar to that of competitive games such as football or chess but radically different from that governing technological activities such as construction or engineering, where there is no living, thinking opponent capable of reacting to one’s moves. To describe this kind of logic, the American military writer Edward Luttwak has used the term paradoxical. The title is apt, but the idea is as old as warfare itself.

The single most effective means available to the tactician consists of putting his enemy on the horns of a dilemma—deliberately creating a situation in which he is “damned if he does and damned if he does not.” For example, commanders have always attempted to outflank or encircle the enemy, thus dividing his forces and

compelling him to face in two directions at once. Another example, well known to the early modern age, consisted of confronting the enemy with coordinated attacks by [cavalry](#) and cannon—the former to force him to close ranks, the latter to compel him to open them. A good 20th-century example was the World War I practice—revived by the Iraqis in their [war](#) against Iran in the 1980s—of shelling the enemy’s front with a combination of high explosive and gas. The former was designed to compel him to seek cover, the latter, being heavier than air, to abandon it on pain of suffocation.

The need for flexibility

Thus considered, the principles of tactics look simple enough. However, it is one thing to analyze tactics in the abstract but entirely another thing to put theory into practice under different circumstances, on different kinds of terrain, against different kinds of enemy, with the aid of troops who may be tired or confused or recalcitrant, and amid every kind of mortal danger. As the great Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz said, “In war everything is simple, but even the simplest thing is difficult.” Sophisticated tactics require well-trained, articulated forces consisting of different units that are armed with different weapons and possess different capabilities. Next, these units must be subordinated to a single directing brain and must be employed in a coordinated manner following a single, well-considered plan: hence the principle of unity of command.

Even then, tactics are not just a question of executing a plan, however clever and well conceived. In tactics, even more than elsewhere, a commander who can only make a plan and carry it out avails nothing; inasmuch as he is confronting a living enemy, what matters is his ability to adapt the plan to that enemy’s reactions rapidly, smoothly, and without losing his grip. Flexibility is thus a cardinal principle of tactics. But flexibility will prevail only if it can be bound by a firm disciplinary framework. Moreover, flexibility and discipline are not easy to combine and can often be achieved only at each other’s expense. Other things being equal, the larger and more powerful a given force, the less flexible it will be.

As an armed force exchanges blows with an enemy, adapting to his moves and forcing him to adapt in return, opportunities to take him by surprise should present themselves. Surprise presupposes secrecy, but secrecy may be hard to combine with the rapid action that is often necessary for implementing surprise. Like everything else in tactics, overcoming this paradox is a matter of striking a balance, first in general and then against a specific enemy, under specific circumstances and with a specific objective in mind.

The importance of terrain

Finally, in tactics (as in strategy) there is the topographical element to consider. [Land warfare](#) is fought neither in a vacuum nor on a uniformly checkered board. Instead, it unfolds over concrete terrain, including roads, passages, elevated ground, cover, and obstacles of every kind. Victory goes to him who best understands and utilizes the terrain; this may be done by, for example, occupying dominant ground, utilizing cover, compelling the enemy to fight on terrain for which his forces are not suitable, cornering him, outflanking him, or surrounding him. All these methods are as old as warfare, yet at the same time they remain relevant to the present age. On their correct application the outcome of battle depends.

Historical development

Tribal and ancient tactics

The ambush and the trial of strength

The oldest, most primitive field tactics are those that rely on concealment and surprise—*i.e.*, the [ambush](#) and the [raid](#). Such tactics, which are closely connected to those used in hunting and may indeed have originated in the latter, are well known to tribal societies all over the world. Typically the operation gets under way when warriors, having reconnoitred the terrain and stalked their enemy, take up concealed positions and wait for the signal. The engagement opens by means of such long-range missile weapons as the javelin, the bow, the sling, and the tomahawk. Once the enemy has been thrown into disorder and some of his personnel killed or wounded, cover is discarded, and short-range weapons such as club, spear, and dagger are employed for delivering the coup de grace. Since concealment is vital and there is no sophisticated logistic apparatus, the number of combatants is usually no more than a few dozen or, at the very most, a few hundred. Tactical units are unknown and command arrangements, to the extent that they exist at all, elementary. None of this, however, is to say that such tactics are simpleminded. On the contrary, making the best use of difficult terrain such as mountains, forests, or swamps usually requires much skill and presupposes an intimate familiarity with the surroundings. Apart from ambush and raid, which depend on making the best possible use of terrain, many primitive tribes also engage in formal, one-to-one frontal encounters that are part battle, part sport. The weapons employed on such occasions usually consist of the club (or its more advanced form, the mace), spear, and javelin, sometimes joined by the bow and special blunted arrows. Defensive [armour](#) consists of nonmetallic body cover of wood, leather, or wickerwork, often made in fantastic

forms and painted extravagant colours in order to enlist the aid of spirits and terrify the opponent. Such fights differ from those described above in that the warriors stand in full view of each other across specially selected level terrain, the objective being to please the spectators and gather glory for themselves. However, here too there can be no question either of formations or of a command system. Rather, each man picks his opponent and fights separately. Hence, it is impossible to speak of tactics, except in the limited sense of the skill displayed by individual warriors in handling their weapons.

The [phalanx](#)

To judge from numerous descriptions in Homer, archaic [Greek](#) warriors still acted in this way. The heroes on each side knew each other by reputation and sought each other out, forming pairs and fighting hand-to-hand without any regard for either collective action or the discipline and organization that were needed for it. However, the *Iliad* also contains passages that may indicate a more advanced form of tactics—namely, the [phalanx](#). Phalanx tactics are known from ancient Sumer and Egypt as well as from Greece. Their essence consisted of packing troops together in dense, massive blocks, to some extent sacrificing flexibility, mobility, and the possibility of concealment in order to achieve mutual protection and maximize striking power.

In Greek armies the usual number of ranks was 8, but formations 16 and even 50 deep are recorded. Insofar as they relied on brute force, such tactics were often considered primitive even in their own day—for example, by the Persian commander Mardonius in describing them to his master, Xerxes I. For a phalanx to execute even a simple lateral evasive move, the troops had to be “professors of war”; such was the Roman historian Plutarch’s expression in describing the disaster suffered by Sparta at the Battle of Leuctra in 371 bc. As Sumerian reliefs, Egyptian wooden models, and Greek narratives show, the typical weapons employed by the phalanx were consistently short-range, hand-held instruments such as sword, spear, and pike, used in accordance to whether individual duels or mass action was considered more important. These weapons were invariably combined with defensive gear such as helmets, corselets, shields, and greaves, although here too the amount of protection varied from one case to the next (see [photograph](#)).

The chariot

Invented in the 3rd millennium bc, the first chariots seem to have been too slow and cumbersome to serve in combat, but about 2000 bc the light, horse-drawn, two-wheeled vehicles destined to revolutionize tactics appeared in the Western Steppe and Mesopotamia, Syria, and Turkey, from which they spread in all directions. In combination with the bow, the chariot represented a very effective system, so much so that in biblical times it became almost synonymous with military power. The great advantage of the chariot was its speed, which permitted it to drive circles around the phalanx, staying out of range while raining arrows on the foot soldiers. Once the latter had been thrown into disorder, it might be possible to put the chariots into formation, charge, and ride the enemy down. Relying on such tactics, the chariot-riding Aryan peoples were able to undertake some of the most extensive conquests in history, spreading over the Eurasian landmass and inflicting crushing defeats on the materially much more advanced Egyptian and Indian civilizations. The chariot's principal drawbacks were its expense and unsuitability for difficult terrain. Also, it made inefficient use of manpower, since each vehicle required a crew of two and sometimes three men—only one of whom actually handled offensive weapons and struck at the enemy.

Light and heavy cavalry

The next development following chariots was cavalry, which took two forms. From Mongolia to Persia and Anatolia—and, later, on the North American plains as well—nomadic peoples fought principally with missile weapons, especially the bow in its short, composite variety. Equipped with only light armour, these horsemen were unable to hold terrain or to stand on the defensive. Hence, they were forced to employ their characteristic highly mobile “swarming” tactics, riding circles around the enemy, keeping their distance from him, showering him with arrows, engaging in feigned retreats, luring him into traps and ambushes, and forming into a solid mass only at the end of the battle with the aim of delivering the coup de grace. Being obliged to keep their possessions few and light, nomads typically were unable to compete with sedentary civilizations in general material development, including not least metallurgy. Nevertheless, as the Mongols' campaigns were to show, their war-making methods, natural hardihood, and excellent horsemanship made them the equal of anyone in either Asia or Europe until at least the end of the 13th century ad. Among the technically more advanced sedentary civilizations on both edges of the Eurasian landmass, a different kind of cavalry seems to have emerged shortly after

1000 bc. Reliefs from great Assyrian palaces show horsemen, clad in armour and armed with spear or lance, who were used in combination with other troops such as light and heavy [infantry](#). The function of these [cataphracts](#) (from the Greek word for “armour”) was not to engage in long-distance combat but to launch massed shock action, first against the enemy cataphracts and then, having gained the field, against the enemy foot. The fact that ancient cavalry apparently did not possess the [stirrup](#) has often led modern historians to question the mounted soldier’s effectiveness. They argue that, since riders held on only by pressure of their knees, their ability to deliver shock was limited by the fear of falling off their mounts. This argument fails to note that, particularly in Hellenistic times and again in late Roman ones, cavalry forces did indeed play an important, often decisive, part in countless battles. Still, it is true that never during classical antiquity did cavalry succeed in replacing the formations of heavy infantry that remained the backbone of every army.

Combined infantry and cavalry

Classical Greek warfare, as mentioned above, consisted almost exclusively of frontal encounters between massive phalanxes on both sides. However, about the time of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 bc), the phalanx became somewhat more articulated. This permitted the introduction of elementary tactical maneuvers such as massing one’s forces at a selected point, outflanking the enemy, and the oblique approach (in which one wing stormed the enemy while the other was held back). In addition, the phalanx began to be combined with other kinds of troops, such as [light infantry](#) (javelin men and slingers) and cavalry. Indeed, the history of Greek warfare can be understood as a process by which various previously existing types of troops came to be combined, integrated, and made to support one another. This development gained momentum in 4th-century battles, such as the one fought by Thebes against the Thessalians at Cynoscephalae in 364 bc, and it culminated in the hands of [Alexander III](#) the Great, whose army saw most of these different troops fighting side by side. The major exception was horse archers, which were incompatible with a settled way of life and which never caught on in the West. Another was the chariot, which was already obsolescent and, except in backward Britain, disappeared almost completely after its defeat at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 bc.

Commanding standing armies consisting of professionals, Alexander and his successors (*diodochoi*) operated on a much greater scale than did most of their predecessors. The most important *diodochoi* were quite capable of concentrating 80,000 to 100,000 men at a single spot, as did both Ptolemy IV and his Seleucid opponent Antiochus III at Raphia in 217 bc. These armies typically went into battle

with a force of light infantrymen in front (elephants were sometimes used, but on the whole they proved as dangerous to their own side as to the enemy). Behind the light troops came the heavy phalanx, flanked by cavalry on both sides. The action would start with each side's light troops trying to drive the opponents back upon their phalanx, thus throwing it into disorder. Meanwhile, the cavalry stood on both sides. Usually one wing, commanded either by the king in person or by one of his closest subordinates, would storm forward. If it succeeded in driving away the opposing cavalry—and provided it remained under control—it could then swing inward and act as the hammer to the phalanx's anvil. Such were the methods by which the great Hellenistic battles such as Gabiene (317 bc) and Ipsus (301 bc) were won. The same applied to the one fought by Hannibal at Cannae in 216 bc; this owed its exceptionally decisive character to the envelopment of the Roman infantry by two cavalry arms instead of one.

The legion

Though its exact origins are unknown, the Roman legion seems to have developed from the phalanx. In fact, it was a collection of small, well-integrated, well-coordinated phalanxes arrayed in checkerboard formation and operating as a team. Hellenistic heavy infantry relied on the pike almost exclusively; the legion, by contrast, possessed both shock and firepower—the former in the form of the short sword, or *gladius*, the latter delivered by the javelin, or *pilum*, of which most (after 100 bc, all) legionnaires carried two. Screening was provided by light troops moving in front, cohesion by pikemen in the third and rearmost rank. Short arms made it easier for individual soldiers or subunits to turn and change direction. Too, careful articulation, a well-rehearsed command system, and the use of standards—which do not seem to have been carried by Hellenistic armies—made the legion a much more flexible organization than the phalanx. No Greek army could have imitated the movement carried out by Caesar's troops at Ruspinum in Africa in 47 bc, when part of a legion was made to turn around and face an enemy cavalry force coming from the rear. As numerous battles showed, where the terrain was uneven and the chain of command broke down, the legion's advantage was even more pronounced. A phalanx whose ranks were thrown into disorder and penetrated by the enemy's infantrymen was usually lost; a legionary commander could rely on his soldiers' swords to deal with intruders, meanwhile bringing up additional units from both flanks.

As a formation whose main power consisted of its heavy infantry, the legion remained unmatched until the introduction of firearms and beyond. Attempts to imitate its armament and methods were made right down to the 16th century, and

even today some countries still call their forces legions in commemoration of its prowess. During the 1st century bc, legionary organization underwent some changes at the hands of Gaius Marius and Lucius Cornelius Sulla until it reached the zenith of its development about the time of Caesar. Subunits became larger, and the legion incorporated a detachment of heavy cavalry as well as field [artillery](#) in the form of catapults—thus turning into a combined-arms unit and becoming a true forerunner of the modern division. Yet the legion, too, had its limitations when it came to fighting in the dense forests of Germany or, even more so, the open deserts of the Middle East. As Marcus Licinius Crassus' disastrous defeat at Carrhae in 53 bc **[CDF—Crassus was soundly defeated by Parthian Israelites. His entire army was lost but for 10,000 legionnaires who fled to safety—see article below]** demonstrated, it met its match in the eastern light cavalry, with which it could never really come to grips, so that, even after repeated attempts, the Romans failed to subdue Parthia as they had so many other countries. The lesson was not lost. From the time of Belisarius in the 6th century ad, the [Byzantine](#) army always supplemented its infantry and heavy cavalry with units of horse archers, usually consisting of mercenaries recruited from various barbarian tribes. In this way, they were able to counter the Arabs and, later, the Seljuqs.

Historical and Exegetical Commentary

Daniel 11:10-12

The Roman/Parthian Battle of Carrhae 53 BC

NOTE: Parthian heavy cavalry looked exactly like knights out of the Middle Ages of Europe. Parthian statuary looked exactly like the Statue of Liberty (CDF).

Written by: [The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica](#)

BRITANNICA: **Battle of Carrhae**, (53 bce), battle that stopped the Roman invasion of [Parthian](#) Mesopotamia by the [triumvir Marcus Licinius Crassus](#). War was precipitated by Crassus, who wanted a military reputation to balance that of his partners, [Pompey](#) and [Julius Caesar](#).

With seven [legions](#) (about 44,000 men) but only 4,000 [cavalry](#), Crassus invaded [Mesopotamia](#), which was defended by the [Parthian](#) general [Surenas](#). Learning that Surenas was in the desert east of the [Euphrates River](#), Crassus left the cover of the river and struck out toward Carrhae; that move has been condemned as rash, but, since [Seleucia](#) on the [Tigris](#) was his ultimate objective, he had to cross open country at some time. Suddenly the Parthians were upon him, with a force of about 1,000 heavy cavalry and nearly 10,000 horse archers. His troops were neither acclimatized nor adapted to desert warfare. While his son Publius in vain launched a covering attack with his cavalry, the main Roman forces formed a [square](#) against the encircling Parthians and tried unsuccessfully to cover both body and head with their shields against the showers of Parthian arrows.

Surenas's provision of a corps of 1,000 Arabian camels, one for every 10 men, enabled the Parthians to retire by sections and replenish their quivers. Crassus, lacking provisions, was compelled by his demoralized men to negotiate but was cut down by the Parthians in the attempt. About 10,000 Romans escaped, but the rest of Crassus's men were either captured or killed. The Parthians had dealt a stunning blow to Roman prestige in the East, and the death of Crassus had serious repercussions on Roman political life.